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NOTES ON CREDIBILITY AND STABILIZATION
ABSTRACT
Do existing theories of stabilization help understand the
credibility issues involved in such programs? The experience with
stabilization in a hyperinflation setting in Israel and Latin America
makes it worthwhile to ask how much existing theories help understand
the success and failure of these experiments. Theories typically
focus on interaction between policy makers and the public, with
imperfect information about the true nature of the government and
resulting games. But this model often does not help greatly in
explaining stabilization. These notes raise some of the questions
left unanswered by the traditional modelling of credibility.
The first sections deals with stabilization as a one-
shot problem. This approach is used to ask what "credibility might
mean in a world where it is inconceivable that a program will succeed
with probability 1. A model is spelled out where the equilibrium
program has an ex ante probability of success. The model draws
attention to the factors which raise or lower the probability of
success of a stabilization program. The next section deals with the
problem of waiting which is familiar from the option literature and
recent international applications. It is shown here that in the
immediateaftermath of stabilization there is a great difficulty in
persuading the public torepatriate assets and engage in irreversible
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The experience with stabilization in a hyperinflation
setting in Israel and Latin America makes it worthwhile to ask how much
existingtheories help understand the success and failure of these experiments.
Many theories focus on interaction between policy makers and the public, with
imperfect informationaboutthe true nature of the government and resulting
games. But this model often does not seem to help greatly in explaining
stabilization. Interest rates do not behave as if they were generated by this
model and the veryfactof stabilization has interestingaspects that are
neglected in thereputation paradigm. These notes raise some of the questions
left unanswered by the traditional modelling of credibility.
The first sections deals with stabilization as a one-shot
problem. This approach is used to ask what credibility" mightmeanin a world
where it is inconceivable that a program will succeed with probability 1. A
model is spelled out where the equilibrium program has an cx ante probability
of success. The model draws attention to the factors whichraiseor lower the
probability of success of a stabilization program. The next section deals with
the problemof waiting which is familiar fromthe option literature and recent
internationalapplications. Itisshown here that in theimmediateaftermath of
1Thesenotes representresearch inprogressrather than completed work.I am
indebted to Alberto Alesina, Peter Diamond, Avinash Dixit, Elhanan Helpman,
Michael Mussa and AaronTornell forhelpful suggestions.2
stabilization there is a great difficulty in persuading the public to
repatriate assets and engage in irreversible investment except at a large
premium. But generating that premium is politically difficult.
1. A POSITIVE THEORY OF CREDIBILITY AND STABILIZATION
Sargent's work on the end of four big inflations made the
term "credible" a household word.2 Stabilizations which proved successful did
so because they were credible. But Sargent did not offer a formal model of
credibility nor did he consider other stabilization programs that had much the
same features as the successful ones, but ultimately failed. In Dornbusch and
Fischer (1986) we review a large number of stabilization attempts and conclude
that slippage of fiscal policy is invariably the reason for a sliding back into
high inflation.3 But this subsequent deterioration often is not apparent at the
outset of the program. By contrast, in several of the stabilizations that did
succeed there was initially a serious lack of credibility, at least in so far
as daily newspapers allow us to ascertain.
In Dornbusch (1987) I study public assessment of the German
stabilization and conclude that rather than being an instantly recognized fact.
stabilization only gradually became a success. But initially and for some
months it continued to be viewed with great scepticism. Many of the budget
reforms initially announced, in fact never took place. As another example, in
1924 Poincare attempted a stabilization in France and after a short period the
2For a review of the credibility literature see Persson (1988).
3See,too, Webb (1988) who discusses the failed stabilizations in Germany
preceding that of November 1923.3
program failed. In 1926 Poincare tried again, undertook much the same measures
and succeeded. Much of the uninformed discussion plays up Poincare as a
"credible" policy maker and his program as one sure to succeed. But there is an
obvious difficulty in reconciling the 1924 and 1926 experiences.
There is a more substantive point to be made about
credibility: governments cannot, in fact, create facts that are set once and
for ever, immutably. Any program can be undone (with more or less difficulty)
by the next government. And this potential lack of persistence feeds back to
the current policy actions required to make the program survive. Moreover, even
a well-designed program may not be sturdy enough to withstand shocks such as a
major, unexpected terms of trade deterioration. Thus credibility is a relative
term and there is a need for a model of credibility.4 A stabilization is ex
ante more or less credible. We need a theory to capture how the public forms a
judgment of this credibility and how that judgment possibly interacts with the
credibility.
Broadly, stabilization fails for one of four reasons. The
first is that a government is ignorant of economics. The program, although
believed to be a good one, is demonstrably unsustainable. We have no theory of
why governments might be ignorant and information costs (given the price of
economics) is merely a way of covering this up. A second possibility which is
'Research by Calvo (1987,88) focus precisely on this point. There is, of
course, an ample literature on credibility in models of repeated games and
reputation (See Persson (1988)), but their primary focus is on dynamics,
learningand dissimulation. This maybeanimportant complication of the
stabilization problem. A first useful step is to highlight the issues that
arise in a one-shot game as is done below.4
central to the imperfect information-reputation literature on credibility
resides in excessive doubts by the public about the policy maker's willingness
to see the program through.
My interest is in the other two reasons for failure which
arise from uncertainty about either the effectiveness of the program or about
uncontrollable events (say export prices or worl1 interest rates) which
interact with the program and influence its success or failure. I will focus
first on this latter uncertainty and develop a specific model.
A Model: Suppose, for concreteness, that we discuss a situation of exchange
rate stabilization. We think of the problem as a one-shot game. The
stabilization program is the solution to minimizing a loss function:
(1) L —(pK+
wherep denotes the probability of program failure and A stands for adjustment
effort. The government assigns a cost K to failure and hence pK is the expected
cost of program failure. The second term measures the cost of adjustment.
Adjustment means real wage cuts or real spending cuts and as such is
politically costly.
The adjustment effort, A,isone of the determinants of the
probability that the program will succeed. Once the adjustment effort is
undertaken the private sector responds by deciding whether or not to undertake
capital flight. The model is completed by a realization from the stochastic5
process that influences foreign exchange revenues. Ourattentionnow focuses on
the construction of the cx ante probability of program success or failure.
The probability of failure of a stabilization program is the
result of an optimizing approach of the government which involves
interdependence with the publics judgment of how successful stabilization will
be. We start from a model in which there are no capital flows and only later
introduce this complication. The program fails if net foreign exchange
disbursements, F, exceed available reserves, R.
(2) }'—x -aA>R
Net foreign exchange disbursements have twocomponents.There is a random
component, x, and there is also the component that depends on adjustment effort
(the real exchange rate). The more substantial the adjustment effort, other
things equal, the smaller expected net disbursements. Specifically, a real
depreciation (an increase in A) would reduce the trade deficit and hence the
foreign exchange drain.
The probabilityof failure isthe probability of net foreign
exchangedisbursements in excessofreserve holdings:
(3) p—p(x)'R+aA)6
Atthis stage we can assume a particular distribution to calculate a
closed form expression for p. An alternative route is to employ Tchebycheff's
inequality which yields an upper bound on the probability of program failure:5
(4) p (x>R+aA) —o2/(R+oA)2
where is the variance of x.
The goverlunent minimizes the loss function subject to (4).
The first order condition then is:
(5) AA —aK2/(aA+R)3
Figure 1 illustrates the solution. The marginal cost of
adjustment (NC) is proportional to the level of adjustment effort, ).A. The
coefficientA is the parameter determining the marginal cost of adjustment. The
marginal benefit MB—aci2K/(mA+R)3 deriving from the reduction in the expected
cost of program failure is shown by the downward slopingschedule.
Theequilibrium adjusent effort is denoted by A*:
(6)
5Fromthe inequality p(x1w) l/k2 with c the standard deviation of the zero
mean distribution of x, let ko—aA+R to obtain the upper bound on the





and, from substitution in (3) there is a corresponding equilibrium probability
of program failure:
(7) p* —
Thenext step is to enquire what are the properties of this
probability. To fix ideas we use the case of a symmetric uniform distribution
with maximum realizations of x denoted by rn.6 In that case the probability of
program failure as a function of adjustment effort is:
(3a) p —(m-R-aA)/2m
To derive the comparative static properties it is helpful to focus on Figure 2
which shows iso-cost curves corresponding to eq. (1) as well as the probability
schedule corresponding to (3a). The optimal choice of adjustment effort and the
corresponding equilibrium probability of program failure are shown by point E.
The optimal adjustment effort becomes:
(6a) A*
and the resulting optimal probability of programfailurebecomes:
(7a) p* (l-R/m)/2 -a2K/8Am2




A shift in R, a or a will affect the probability schedule while changes in A or
K affect the iso-loss loci. Using the diagram or equations (7a) it is straight
forward to derive the following properties.
Program failure is less likely the higher the initial
stock of reserves, R. This point draws attention to the role of foreign loans
in stabilization programs. Austria in the l920s benefited from League of
Nations Loans and Israel in its stabilization could call on US aid. In much the
same way Bolivia announced suspension of external debt service which amounted
to a self-administered external loan. In the literature on stabilization
foreign loans are discussed as the sine qua non. In the present model they do
play a role because they are a substitute for adjustment.
A higher marginal cost of adjustment (a larger A) implies
a higher probability of program failure. In societies that are politically
highly polarized adjustment is much more costly. As a result adjustment effort
will be less and hence the probability of program failure will be larger. The
coefficient A could be interpreted in terms of the scope for cooperation
between unions and the government: in Israel and texico such cooperation is
possible and important, in Argentina it is excluded. Alesina (1988),
Eichengreen (1988) and Dornbusch (1985) have emphasized the political costs in
polarized societies of undertaking adjustment programs.
Ahigher responsiveness of thetrade balance to adjustment
effort implies a larger optimal adjustment effort and hence a reduced
probability of failure. This responsiveness can be interpreted as the extent to9
which an economy is open or closed. An open economies can achieve major trade
improvements with relatively small real depreciation. Very closed economies
have to achieve larger depreciation or expenditure cuts.
• Countries with a more volatile external balance, in the
sense of a, will make larger adjustment efforts. But the larger adjustment
effort does not translate into a reduced probability of failure.
• The higher the cost of program failure, K, the larger the
adjustment effort and the lower the probability of failure. One might
conjecture that in a situation where there have been marty previous failures the
costs in terms of prestige or politics are small. Hence the investment in
stabilization will be small and, in a self-fulfilling way, most programs will
fail except if they were to experience unusually favorable (unexpected)
conditions.
These predictions make up a positive theory of adjustment.
The testing involves a cross section of stabilization programs where the
characteristics of countries (R,a,A,a,K) are used to determine their a priori
probability of success.
Capital flight: The most jedia:e extension is to consider a role for capital
flows. Specifically assume that private capital flight will depend on the
probabilityof program failure anticipated by the publicwhich we denote by p.
Ourcriterion for the probability of program failure now becomes:
(8) p —p(x >R+aA -np)10
where pmeasuresthe response of capital flight to the perceived probability of
failure. We consider first the case where the government selects its adjustment
effort, followed then by the capital flight decision of the public before the
realization of the trade shocks is seen. In this case a Stackelberg solution is
appropriate. The government recognizes that the public will evaluate the
adjustment effort in the same way the government does and hence arrive at the
same estimate of the probability of success. We therefore immediately set p—p'
in (5). Now Tchebycheff's inequality yields a more complicated relation for the
probability of failure, namely:
(9) R+aA -pp—a/Jp
The solution for the probability is a cubic the analytical
solution to which is not very helpful. From Figure 3 where we plot the left
(LH) and right hand side (RH) of theequation it is apparent that now there is
a possibility of multiple equilibria.But in the Stackelberg case this is not a
problemsince the public will assume that the government will select among the
two possible solutions the adjustment effort which represents yields minimum
cost.
We can once again look atthecase of a uniform distribution
which yields as the equilibrium failure probability:7






It is readily verified that this expression is an increasing
function of p.Increasedcapital leads to a larger adjustment effort but even
so brings with it an increased probability of program failure.
Nash Eouilibrium: In our analysis above the Stackelberg solution was
appropriate since the public decides on capital flight only after the
government selects the adjustment effort. Rut if the capital flightdecision
were to be made concurrently with the government's choice of the adjustment
effort a Nash equilibrium is also a plausible solution.
Now the government finds the optimal adjustment effort for a given
p'. Then the rational expectations assumption p—p' is imposed on the solution.
The resulting expression for the equilbrium probability of program failure is:
(7c) p* —(l-R/m)/(2-fl/m)-a2K/A(2m-fl)
Comparisonwith (7a) readily reveals that in the Nash case, because the
government does not internalize at the optimization stage the effects of
adjustment on capital flight, adjustment effort is less and the probability of
program failure is higher.12
Extensions: There is a number of directions in which the model can useful;y be
extended.
• Rather than assuming that capital flight takes the simple form p,
a more appropriate model involves the expected interest differential adjusted
for exchange losses. Thus the capital flight component,, rather than being p
becomes:
(10) C— [i*-(l-p)i-pt
where i and j* are the home and foreign interest Orates andis the percentage
loss suffered in case of program failure. This will typically be an exchange
loss. In this extended model interest rates and the extent of exchange loss
under program failure become additional determinants of the ex ante probability
of failure.
• The kind of uncertainty. Rather than focusing on the program parts,
we can look at uncertainty about key parameters in the optimal stabilization.
Specifically, there mightbeuncertainty about the coefficient a which links
adjusent effort to trade performance. There mightalsobe uncertainty about
the costs of stabilization so that the coefficient is random. This multiplier
uncertainty is imtortant because, unlike in the model developed above, the
government's adjustment effort will influence the variance of foreign exchange
flows.
• Modelling stabilization as a two-period problem. In the first
period the government undertakes stabilization, (followed by capital flight or13
not) and the realization of stochasticslW€kJ.. Then, using the accumulated
information prior to a second period, the governmentmakes "readjustments" in
its stabilization program. This modelling would
be particularly useful if we
deal with uncertainty regarding the effectivenessof programs. It also applies
if in fact the public doubts that the government will infact carry ottthe
programas initially announced.
The model has been developed in terms of an exchange rate
stabilization problem. But the approach is obviously more general.Specifically
it should be possible to express a theory of fiscal andinflation stabilization
in these terms.
2. WAITING
A common problem in the aftermath of stabilization isthe
lack of a stabilizing capital reflow. Investors have an option to postponethe
return of flight capitaland theywill wait untilthefrontloadingof returns
issufficient to compensate for the risk of relinquishing theliquidity option
of a wait-and-see position. This is the case even when interest rates are high
andrewarding.Moreover, when capital does returnitchooses a highly liquid
form,sitting so to speak in the parking lot, with the engine running.There is
definitely little coimaitment to a rapid resumption of real investment. The
reason for this is residual uncertainty whether stabilization can infact-be
sustained.
In the literature this topic has been addressed in a number
of ways, mostly in terms of irreversible investmentdecisions.8We concentrate
van Wijnbergen (1985), Bodin and Serven (1986), Reynoso14
here on a very simple two-period example to make the basic point. Suppose that
investors have the choice between investing in the US or in Mexico. The return
in the US in both periods is R*_(l+r*). In Mexico the first period certain
return is R*+m. In the second period, with probability p events are good and
the return is RG. With probability (l-p) they are bad and the return is only
R.
The question now is how much of a first period premium is
required to induce investors to accept the uncertainty and invest immediately
for two periods. We assume that investors have the choice to postpone the
decision to invest until the uncertainty is resolved; they cannot, however,
disinvest in Mexico after the first period, upon finding out that a bad state
has materialized. The decision then is to invest now or to wait until
uncertainty is resolved.
Table 1Expected Investment Returns
1st Period 2nd Period
Invest in Mexico R* +m pRG+(l-p)R
Now Irreversibly
Wait and See R* pRG +(lp)R*
To sharpen the point we assume that theexpectedreturn in
the second period is equal to the US return, thatisR* pEG +(1p)RB.Tne
relevant criterion for immediate investment in Mexico then is:15
(11) (R*+m)[pRG +(l-p)Rl>R*(pRC+(1p)R*)
which, noting that R*_pRC +(1-p)R8,this expression reduces to
(12) a (1p)(R* -RB)
Thus a risk neutral investor requires a premium to make an
investment which has the same second period expected return (R*) as his
alternative investment opportunity. The reason is that with waiting an even
higher return can be achieved, once uncertainty is resolved (ornarrowed down).
The premium required for immediate investment is higher the larger is the
probability of a bad state and the larger is the discrepancy betweenthe
foreign rate of return and that prevailing in an adverse state.
But how can governments reassure investors? The common
answer is to bring about a "credible" stabilization. In practice it comesdown
tohigh interest rates and an exchange rate so competitive that expected
further depreciation is unlikely. But high interest rates are counterproductive
from a point of view of growth because they lead to holding of paper assets
rather than real investment. A low real exchange rate cuts the standard of
living and thus reduces domestic demand and profitability for all investments
except in the traded goods sector.
But if real depreciation is not sufficient to bring about
investment the government faces a very awkward position: income is being
redistributed from labor to capital, but because the real depreciation is not16
sufficient (in terms of (12)), the increased profits are taken out as capital
flight. Labor will obviously insist then that the policy be reversed. This
uncertainty is an important feature in understanding the real exchange rate -
capitalflight relationships and the post-stabilization difficulties in
developing countries and the stabilization experience of the 1920s.
Extensions: The model as set out misses one important point. The Wait-
and-see strategy may forego capital gains which go to those who invest early.
Therefore the criterion in (12) may be overly stringent. Of course, that need
not be the case since in bad outcomes there will be capital losses and these
act as a deterrent to early investment. On balance therefore the capital gain
issue may not create a bias either way.
The model can be taken in two directions. One is to develop
an extension that fleshes Out the good and bad states in terms of a more
complete model of the economy. Specifically it is important to model the
relationship between real wages and the profitability of capital. If this model
isto beused to explain the reluctance to invest in real assets in a
precariouscountry then the returns must be linked tofactor costs andexchange
rates.Such a model bringsOut theadjustmentcosts required to bring in direct
investment.
Theother direction of research is to explore wIth this
model the actual pattern of capital return: how rapidly do financial flows
reverse themselves and how long does it take before investment in real assets
resumes.17
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